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1 For the purpose of this paper, “migrants” are understood as all 
individuals moving with the goal of long-term establishment in another 
With 135,711 people reaching Europe by sea since the start 
of 2016, adding up to the 1,321,560 asylum claims in 2015, 
the European Union (EU) faces a serious challenge to its 
reception system. Decision-makers in the member states, as 
well as EU officials and media pundits, have been using the 
expression ‘Refugee Crisis’ to refer to the high inflows of 
asylum seekers.1 However, the current phenomenon is 
neither new nor exclusive to the EU. This Policy Brief argues 
that the term ‘refugee crisis’ forms part of a revealing 
discourse  that has developed around the EU’s security-
oriented strategy of migration management and discusses 
the implications of such an approach for the European 
integration project. 
Refugees and Europe – old story, new shock 
The war in Syria and the enduring political instability in Libya, 
Afghanistan and Iraq have triggered high inflows of asylum-
seekers into the EU. This phenomenon, albeit unusual, is not 
unprecedented in European contemporary history.  
In the years immediately after the Second World War, 
millions of displaced people had to resettle in different states 
from those which they had been living in before. The 1951 
Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees was agreed to 
address that issue, as a very ‘European’ document in spirit. 
During the Cold War, the members of the European 
Communities adopted an open-door policy towards asylum-
seekers from the East. More recently, the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia entailed a period of regional 
instability that triggered remarkable inflows of asylum-
seekers into EU countries.  
All EU member states have sought to grant formal recognition 
to the their obligations towards refugees, not only by 
ratifying the 1951 Convention and the related 1967 Protocol, 
country; “asylum-seekers’ are individuals who have lodged an asylum 
application; “refugees” are individuals who have been granted asylum. 
Executive Summary 
 Labelling the current high inflow of asylum-
seekers to the EU a ‘refugee crisis’ shifts the 
focus from the EU’s lack of a coherent 
response to the alleged ‘burden’ that 
refugees represent for Europe. 
 Member states’ security-oriented approach 
is not effective in curbing arrivals and indeed 
does not remove the long-term causes of 
people’s decisions to leave their homes. 
 The EU needs to reframe the issue of 
refugee/migrant inflows in more 
comprehensive terms so as to live up to its 
core values and legal obligations regarding 
the humanitarian protection of people in 
need.  
 Firm political commitment is necessary to 
align values and action, and provide a 
durable solution to the EU’s current 
identity crisis. 
 In practical terms, EU and member state 
officials from the foreign affairs and 
development fields as well as stakeholders 
from civil society need to work alongside 
justice and home affairs officials to shape 
and implement appropriate measures. 
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but also by inserting direct references to the two documents 
in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (Art. 78) and the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Art. 18-19).  
Despite the EU’s familiarity with the migration of people in 
distress both from the outside and within its borders, the 
political and media reaction to the current events is 
unprecedented. Nationalistic and xenophobic calls to ‘stop 
the invasion’ have resounded all over Europe, including from 
those Central and Eastern European countries whose citizens 
greatly benefitted from the member states’ policy of 
humanitarian protection during the Cold War.  
To understand this reaction, the anti-refugee backlash has to 
be put into the context of the persisting economic and 
political crises experienced by many European countries: the 
so-called ‘sovereign debt’ crisis, the general difficulties of the 
Eurozone, the Brexit and Grexit scenarios, the tensions in the 
East given Russia’s pressure on Ukraine, the Da’esh threat to 
the Southern neighbours, and the rise of right-wing, populist 
movements in EU countries are all interlinked factors that 
affect the perception of the phenomenon of migratory flows 
and shape the current security-oriented response. Faced with 
several, simultaneous challenges, many EU member states 
have favoured protecting their national security interests 
over fulfilling their communitarian obligations.  
Which ‘crisis’? Reframing the issue of refugee 
inflows 
‘Refugee crisis’ is not a language-neutral expression. The 
juxtaposition of the concept of ‘crisis’ to the reference to 
‘refugees’ identifies a sole source for the ‘problem’ – the 
uncontrolled arrival of desperate foreigners – and implicitly 
suggests which actors are most apt to deliver a ‘solution’, 
namely those professionals perceived to be able to stop the 
migrant flow, most notably from the defence and police 
sectors.  
Justice and Home Affairs ‘technical’ agencies assuming 
political roles 
The question of the reception and integration of people in 
distress into European countries is politically sensitive. 
Caught between the conflicting pressures of xenophobic 
parties and humanitarian NGOs, member state officials have 
been trying to avoid taking a clear stance on the issue by 
outsourcing the responsibility to deal with refugees and 
migrants to EU ‘technical’ agencies and third-country 
governments. 
Established in the framework of the EU’s 2004 ‘big bang’ 
enlargement, the European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the 
Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX) was 
conceived as a trade-off for member states’ alleged loss of 
control over their borders. Although its tasks are formally 
limited to “improving the integrated management of the 
external borders” and “promoting solidarity between 
member states”, in practice FRONTEX activities have been 
stretched to include tasks of a more operational nature. The 
agency has increasingly coordinated joint operations aimed 
at deterring migrants from crossing EU air, land and sea 
borders. For instance, FRONTEX mission Triton in the 
Mediterranean Sea has recently replaced Italy’s search-and-
rescue mission Mare Nostrum, whose humanitarian action 
had contributed to saving thousands of lives at sea. Triton has 
been criticised by the European Council on Refugees and 
Exiles for its strong focus on internal security.  
Similarly, the European Police Office (EUROPOL) has been 
expanding its functions since its creation in 1995, so as to 
include areas relevant to border protection such as the 
trafficking of human beings. In addition to facilitating 
information exchanges between member states and with 
third countries, EUROPOL has also been increasingly granted 
operational powers. It can now participate in criminal 
investigations conducted by Joint Investigation Teams, made 
up of representatives of national police forces. The actions of 
EUROPOL in this domain seem thus to be in line with EU 
priorities on migration control. However, by restricting 
organised entry into the Union, EUROPOL also prevents 
access to a broad range of individuals, some of whom may be 
in genuine need of international protection. 
In synthesis, FRONTEX and EUROPOL have been expanding 
the scope of their functions to an extent that goes beyond the 
coordination duties originally designed for them. While the 
dominant institutional and media framing portrays the 
agencies as de-politicised actors performing technical duties 
of public utility, the ‘home affairs focus’ of these agencies is 
intrinsically political and affects both their vision and 
practices. 
Outsourcing responsibility to third states as a tool for EU 
burden-shifting 
According to the figures provided by the UN Agency for 
Refugees (UNHCR), Turkey is hosting more than 2.7 million 
refugees. Iran and Pakistan are hosting one million each, 
while inflows of refugees to Jordan and Lebanon have 
increased the populations of these two countries by 20%. EU 
member states, on their side, are facing the challenge to 
integrate 1 million refugees into a population of 510 million, 
which amounts to a demographic impact of less than 0.3%. 
Evidence shows that if a ‘refugee crisis’ is really happening, it 
is taking place outside the EU. Nevertheless, European 
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leaders refrain from stepping up their political commitment 
to address the current events. 
At the EU-Turkey summit on 7 March 2016, EU Heads of State 
and Government struck a deal that confirms the recent trend 
in migration management. The agreement foresees that all 
new, irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to Greece will 
be sent back. In exchange, EU leaders agreed on the 
progressive resettlement of up to 72000 Syrian refugees from 
Turkish camps into EU countries. Donald Tusk, the President 
of the European Council, called the deal a “breakthrough” 
and “a very clear message that the days of irregular migration 
to Europe are over”. However, the EU-Turkey deal is only the 
last of many agreements sealed between the EU and third 
countries in the last decade. The goal is always the same: 
outsourcing the control of member states’ borders and 
shifting the responsibility for migrants’ destiny from 
European political leaders to actors not accountable to the 
European citizens. 
Well-aware of Europe’s anxieties over migrant inflows, 
neighbouring states have been developing remarkable 
negotiation skills to extract political gains from deepening 
border cooperation. Prior to the Arab Spring, and despite 
widespread concerns over human rights violations in Libya 
and Tunisia, Italy and France ensured then-presidents Ben 
Ali’s and Gaddafi’s commitment to curb departures in return 
for political recognition and economic aid. More recently, 
Morocco has been exploiting its newly acquired status as 
‘transit state’ to gain concessions from the EU in fields such 
as fishing rights, acquiescence over the occupied Western 
Sahara and migration rights for its citizens through the 
Mobility Partnership agreed with the European Commission. 
Lastly, following the freshly sealed EU-Turkey deal, Ankara 
will receive a significant financial contribution and the 
guarantee of new political impetus for its EU accession 
process, on top of the compulsory relocation of Syrian 
refugees from its territory  to the EU. 
Although the cost of these agreements in terms of political 
concessions and financial contributions is high, member 
states seem willing to pay. Outsourcing police control to third 
states allows for a de-politicisation of the issue, producing 
short-term electoral gains for European leaders. The rhetoric 
of ‘preventing deaths at sea by preventing departures’ abides 
by the same logic of shifting risks and responsibilities over to 
neighbouring countries, under the guise of a humanitarian 
concern for the safety of migrants. 
Short-termed, short-sighted: the EU’s trade of 
values for security 
By delegating political responsibility to supposedly ‘technical’ 
agencies, and using neighbouring states as filters to curb 
migration inflows into Europe, the EU is narrowing its room 
of manoeuvre both internally and externally. At the EU level, 
the choice to prioritise internal security over fundamental 
rights allows for a strong comeback of national interests over 
mutual solidarity. On the international stage, the Union 
renounces to play a leading role in its geopolitical 
neighbourhood and risks to compromise its relations with 
regional partners. Under these conditions, the very existence 
of the European integration project is in danger. 
Crossed wires: the Dublin system and the European 
integration project 
The Schengen Agreement, which abolished internal borders 
between 22 of the 28 member states, is key to the EU pillar 
of free movement of persons inside the Union. The 
agreement, initially signed in 1985 by 5 of the 10 member 
states at the time, triggered widespread harmonisation of 
national legislations. The 1990 Dublin Convention was signed 
in the context of such renewed impulse towards deeper 
integration. Aimed at guaranteeing that an asylum seeker’s 
claim would be examined by one member state only, the 
Convention was essentially about allocating responsibilities. 
At a moment when wealthy member states were losing grip 
over the control of flows of individuals crossing their 
territories, commitment from comparatively poorer member 
states at the European borders was much needed to ensure 
that asylum-seekers would not be left free to wander 
throughout Europe towards their most preferred 
destinations.  
An uneasy relationship exists between the Schengen rules 
and the Dublin rules, since it is obviously harder in practice to 
enforce the latter rules without border controls between 
countries. As it is conceived today, the Dublin system is highly 
ineffective. Criteria associated with border control mean that 
responsibility for an asylum claim becomes a burden for the 
member state which allowed the individual to arrive in the 
Union. This imbalance risks creating a dangerous race to the 
bottom, as member states develop policies aimed not at 
ensuring access to the procedure but rather at preventing 
asylum-seekers from entering their territory. Consequently, it 
is in migrants’ interests to refrain from applying for the status 
of refugee in the country of first entry, which is likely to apply 
stricter asylum criteria compared to Western and Northern 
member states. The paradox is that the Dublin system not 
only fails to prevent so-called ‘asylum-shopping’, but it may 
well encourage it. 
Originally designed to foster harmonisation of rules and 
increased cohesion, the Dublin system has in fact proved to 
be detrimental to solidarity among member states. The 
unusual inflows of asylum-seekers escaping conflicts in the 
Middle East have led to the resurge of strong calls from some 
 
4 
Theorising the ENP – Conference Report 
© Author name 
CEPOB # 1.15 December 2015 
‘Refugee Crisis’ – ‘EU Crisis’? 
©Tommaso Emiliani     
 
CEPOB # 6.16 - March 2016  
member states for the ‘protection of national interest’. Their 
firm opposition to accept the relocation scheme proposed by 
the Commission, as well as to an increased financial 
contribution targeting a better tackling of the humanitarian 
issue and a fairer burden-sharing, has to be read in this 
context. The current prolonged stalemate constitutes indeed 
a tangible threat for the integration process.  
However, national politicians - whose legitimacy has come 
under pressure by recent crises - are prioritising short-time 
electoral goals over the long-term benefits of a strong and 
united Europe. Although the Dublin system has proved 
incapable of solving the issues it had been established for, 
weakened leaders may be willing to accept a costly, 
inefficient and morally questionable system in order to be 
able to signal to their constituencies that they are in control. 
Normative Power no more: the EU’s retreat from its 
moral agency in the neighbourhood 
Geopolitical opportunities such as the collapse of the Soviet 
Union or the Arab Spring have incited the EU to assert its role 
as a strong political actor in the neighbourhood. A huge 
investment has been made to diffuse so-called ‘European 
values’, which include democratic governance, rule of law 
and respect of human rights. Thanks also to a rather effective 
communication strategy, the ’European welfare state’ model 
has long been regarded from Ukraine to Morocco as a 
textbook example for progress, social protection, freedom 
and security.  
European norms and values are more than constructivist 
ideas useful for the cause of Europe’s cultural diplomacy. 
They constitute a recognisable brand which helps the EU to 
compete in the international arena with actors otherwise 
economically, militarily and demographically superior. One of 
the reasons why so many asylum-seekers are engaging in 
risky journeys to come to the EU instead of going elsewhere 
is the appeal of that brand and the desirability of that model.  
However, recent actions undertaken by EU institutions and 
member states call the commitment to this European model 
into question. The EU is failing to live up to the Geneva 
obligations with regard to providing relief to displaced people 
in distress, and several member states have been caught in 
blatant breach of international provisions against 
refoulement and collective expulsions of ethnic and social 
groups. The EU-Turkey deal, which foresees the forced 
resettlement of migrants from Greece to a country with a 
very questionable human rights record, may just represent 
the last such example.  
Altogether, the EU risks losing its moral credibility due to the 
inconsistency between its proclaimed values and the 
decisions taken. At the 2014 Valletta Summit on Migration, 
African leaders noted how statistically insignificant the 
demographic impact of asylum-seekers on Europe is 
compared to the situation in Africa. And yet, according to the 
UNHCR, “in Africa, the right to seek and enjoy asylum is 
largely respected - with some 3 million refugees having found 
in exile the safety and protection they have lost at home”. 
This discrepancy in its response to humanitarian crises does 
no good to the EU’s prestige.  
More specifically, the treatment reserved to the countries 
taking part in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is 
even more appalling. At a time when the ENP has undergone 
a supposedly deep review to ensure that neighbours’ 
interests are taken into greater account, the EU is once again 
using the neighbourhood as a buffer area to prevent 
unwanted migrants from its soil. By allocating economic aid 
and visa facilitation to its partners in exchange for a 
commitment to halting migration inflows, the EU has got it 
wrong twice. On the one hand, it shows that neighbouring 
states are service suppliers rather than real partners, thus 
undermining the notion of joint ownership which is at the 
core of the ENP project. On the other hand, the EU makes a 
perverse use of conditionality, appealing to ENP states’ 
political realism rather than upholding the universal rights of 
protection. 
Never Waste A Good Crisis: the European Phoenix 
and the Rise from the Ashes 
Against the backdrop of the discussion that precedes, it is 
time for the EU to act and shape the future it wants for itself. 
The naïve belief that renouncing to Schengen would put a halt 
to migratory flows denies the reality of the situation. If 
member states really want to curb the arrival of irregular 
migrants and refugees, they will have to bring back internal 
border controls with fences and border guards across many 
thousands of kilometres of common borders. The likely 
outcome will then be the multiplication of ‘Calais’ and ‘Ceuta’ 
– dramatic deadlocks at the EU’s internal borders. 
Alternatively, the EU can decide to step up its political 
engagement and develop a comprehensive solution to 
address the issue of the inflows of asylum-seekers. Indeed, 
the history of European integration is full of ‘insurmountable 
crises’ turned into propitiatory moments for further 
integration. However, a U-turn from the current practices of 
responsibility shifting is deeply needed. Instead of relying on 
the sole expertise of technical agencies, other relevant 
stakeholders must be brought to the table. The voice of 
representatives from civil society calling for the respect of 
European values and obligations needs to be listened to at 
least as much as the conservative media. Professionals from 
the police and defence sector need to be flanked by their 
colleagues from the area of development policies so as to 
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help establishing favourable conditions for the return of 
migrants to their countries. 
Most of all, the EU must address the main root cause of the 
current flow of people: the ongoing war and political 
instability ravaging the Middle East. Minor arrangements in 
the way member states resettle a handful of refugees inside 
their borders will not prevent Libyans, Afghans, Iraqis, Syrians 
and others to keep seeking for shelter in European countries. 
It is essential for the EU to upgrade the role of the European 
External Action Service in order to include competences of 
internal security in the scope of its external relations. To do 
so, the Common Security and Defence Policy must be 
strengthened and enhanced to make a meaningful impact in 
the region, scaling up its engagement in conflict resolution 
and conflict prevention. In addition to this, other root causes, 
especially those related to the socio-economic development 
and environmental degradation processes in third countries, 
need to be comprehensively tackled.   
To do so, the EU will need to develop a strategic vision of a 
more integrated long-term policy on matters related to 
migration. The central role in forging such a vision falls to 
national politicians. European leadership has proved divided 
and reluctant to take decisive political steps due to fear of 
negative spill-overs at the national level. Recent elections in 
Germany show that even a timid stance in favour of the 
respect of European humanitarian obligations can be 
politically costly.  
However, at this historical moment, Europe needs political 
personalities with a vision and the authority to invest in the 
project of a united EU that protects its soul by living up to its 
founding values. The next political cycle at the EU level and in 
many key member states will begin in 2018-19. The time to 
start developing a strategy geared towards building a future 
for Europe is now. 
 
This Policy Brief is loosely based on the results of the 
roundtable ‘‘Refugee Crisis’−‘EU Crisis’? Causes, 
Consequences, Call for Action’, organised by the Department 
of EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies at the 
College of Europe in Bruges on 2 March 2016. The author 
wishes to express his gratitude to the speakers and 
participants for their insightful contributions to a rich debate. 
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